

## Performance

In 2015 the Guinness Atkinson Dividend Builder fund produced a total return of -3.61% vs the benchmark MSCI World index -0.25%. The fund therefore underperformed the index by 3.36%.

### Average Annualized Returns (as of 12/31/15)

As at 12/31/2015 (in USD)

	Q4 2015	1 YR	3 Yrs (ann.)	5 Yrs (ann.)	10 Yrs (ann.)	Since Inception (03/30/12)
<b>Dividend Builder Fund</b>	4.27%	-3.61%	9.54%	n/a	n/a	8.92%
<b>MSCI World Index</b>	5.64%	-0.25%	10.32%	8.27%	5.65%	9.39%
<b>MSCI World Growth Index</b>	6.41%	3.53%	12.01%	9.28%	6.62%	10.37%
<b>MSCI World Value Index</b>	4.85%	-4.01%	8.64%	7.31%	4.70%	8.46%

30 Day SEC Yield (as of 12/31/15) Subsidized 3.15% | Unsubsidized 0.93%

Gross Expense Ratio: 2.96%. Net Expense Ratio: 0.68%.


The Advisor has contractually agreed to waive fees through June 30, 2016.

*Performance data quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor's shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the Funds may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. For most recent month-end and quarter-end performance, visit [http://www.gafunds.com/GIF\\_performance](http://www.gafunds.com/GIF_performance) or call (800) 915-6566. Total returns reflect a fee waiver in effect and in the absence of this waiver, the total returns would be lower*

## Review of 2015

2015 was a volatile year, with global equities swinging fairly widely from positive to negative returns from one month to the next. Looking at 2015 as a whole it was striking to note the divergence in performance of value and growth stocks. This was a trend that had begun in late 2014 and continued almost uninterrupted through the year.

Figure 1: Value vs growth index performance in 2015 (all Total Returns in USD)




Source : Bloomberg (as of 12/31/15)

It has been well documented that a handful of large, expensive, growth companies like Amazon and Facebook drove the majority of Index performance in the US in 2015. This broad trend of the market rewarding companies that could show growth in revenues or earnings was also seen throughout the rest of the world, as the divergence between the two MSCI World indices shows above. Our approach in the Fund has always been to focus on the value end of the market, and one of the reasons the Fund underperformed the benchmark was our lack of exposure to these more expensively-valued growth stocks. The chart above shows how the Fund performance much more closely followed the value index in 2015. Since the end of September 2014 (when this divergence started), the growth index has outperformed value by over 11%, a significant figure. We cannot, of course, say that this trend will start to reverse in 2016, but the size of the divergence suggests to us that value stocks could well have a better chance of outperforming over the next 3-5 years if this gap is closed.

When we look back at how individual holdings performed in 2015, the picture largely reflects the macro environment – namely falling commodity prices, looming interest rate rises in the US, a slower rate of economic growth in China, continued uncertainty in Europe, and the interlinked effects of all of these factors.

Commodity prices started their precipitous decline back in the summer of 2014, staged a small rebound in the first half of 2015 and then continued their decline in the second half of the year.



Ending Value 311.65 (12/31/15)

From 12/31/10 to 12/31/15

Source Bloomberg

We did not have any exposure to the mining sector so we certainly benefitted from that. We did, however, have a small overweight exposure to the energy sector in the form of Royal Dutch Shell, Total, ENI and CNOOC. The MSCI World Energy sector fell by 22.1% (in USD, see Figure 3) in 2015, but only one of the energy companies that we owned was down by more than that: Royal Dutch Shell. As a group the energy companies that we owned held up well relative to the energy sector.

Expectations of rising interest rates in the US was not a new story for 2015 – they were very much part of the narrative in 2013 and 2014 as well. The companies that we own have tended to have a large spread between their cost of capital and their return on capital. So the effect of rising interest rates has had less of an issue on their valuation than for poor companies with a narrow spread. At the same time the companies we invest in tend to have strong balance sheets, with reasonable amounts of debt and strong credit profiles. Many of these companies have been refinancing their debt over the last five years at extremely attractive rates for long durations. Rising interest rates should have only a modest and gradual effect on their cost of debt financing.

We have a preference for companies that have the ability to grow their dividend over time. Companies can achieve this if they earn a return-on-capital greater than their cost of capital, and can reinvest their profits at a similarly high return-on-capital for the future. This should lead to growth in cash flows, and thus sustainable dividend growth. We therefore tend to avoid companies that offer a high dividend yield but few prospects for growth (such as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and regulated industries like utilities). These companies are more sensitive to interest rate rises due to their high leverage and bond-like characteristics.

The risk of chasing high dividend yield came into stark relief in 2015 in the shape of MLPs. The S&P MLP Index fell -35.1% in 2015. MLPs have tended to have a combination of high leverage, low return-on-capital and low growth prospects, which is the antithesis of what we look for. MLPs had been bid up in the hunt for yield on the thesis that these companies were largely immune to changes in the oil price as they were simply transporting the oil and taking a fee. They took on more debt to engage in more growth

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opportunities, and thereby provide a higher dividend. However, the significant fall in oil prices has led to lower onshore oil production in the US and therefore many of these growth projects have been canned.

The way that changes in interest rate expectations did affect the portfolio in 2015 was really limited to the effect of a stronger dollar on emerging market (EM) currencies. The direct effect was minimal, with our 3% position in Vodacom in South Africa being the only EM currency exposure we had. While Vodacom fell around 8% over the year, it was by no means a disaster. The more significant factors were secondary. Aberdeen Asset Management, which has historically had a strong franchise in emerging market funds, suffered from a mix of poor emerging markets equity performance and significant redemptions. A proportion of these redemptions are likely a result of sovereign wealth funds in the Middle East redeeming on the back of significantly lower oil revenues. The other main secondary effect was the drag on earnings growth of globally diversified businesses. However, the market did not tend to punish these companies particularly harshly.

The interest rate rise that we had all been waiting for came in December, without much drama in markets.

Equity markets experienced a sharp and rapid decline in August, followed by a fairly rapid recovery. The market became spooked when the Chinese unexpectedly devalued their currency on August 11<sup>th</sup>. Whilst it was a small devaluation relative to historic levels, it led to considerable uncertainty. Was this the first of a number of devaluations? What would the effect be on China's trading partners in Asia and beyond? Why were they devaluing their currency? The Chinese eventually communicated the fact that this was part of a process of currency liberalisation rather than to make their exports more competitive. However, some remain sceptical and expect further devaluation.


The Shanghai domestic A-share market had a very turbulent year, but we do not have any exposure to this market. However, we did own three Hong Kong-listed companies: China Mobile, CNOOC and Li & Fung. China Mobile held up well but CNOOC and Li & Fung were a drag.

Europe managed to muddle through another threat of Grexit, but has still not addressed its structural issues. The Eurozone remains dependent on continued central bank support. The civil war in Syria has led to a very large number of refugees coming to Europe, which has in turn brought in to question many of the fundamental principles on which the European dream was founded, such as the free passage within the Schengen area. Combined with the continued sovereign debt issues of Greece and other peripheral European countries, European leaders are likely to continue to struggle to find effective compromises.

Given all the global uncertainty in 2015, it was not surprising that the market favoured defensive industries, with healthcare and consumer staples performing well across regions (see table 3).

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**Figure 3: Total return by region and sector (USD) in 2015**




**Source: Bloomberg**

There are numerous healthcare and consumer staples companies that meet our criteria of consistently high return-on-capital, but valuations for many of these companies have been at historical highs. Naturally some of the holdings we have had in these sectors have been hitting historical high valuations as well, and we have been reducing our exposure to these sectors for the last few years. However, we remain overweight the consumer staples sector and are in line with the healthcare sector. Imperial Tobacco, which we believe still offers a compelling valuation within the consumer staples sector, was our top performing stock in the portfolio for 2015.

In summary, while 2015 was a year where the economic storm has been fairly fierce, pleasingly the portfolio has demonstrated the ability to weather it well.

**Figure 4: Individual stock performance over 2015 For securities held in the portfolio**



Source: Bloomberg

## Changes to the portfolio

In 2015 we bought six new positions and exited six, which meant we ended the year with 34 holdings.

Figure 5: Number of changes to the portfolio

	2013	2014	2015
<b>Buys</b>	7	2	6
<b>Sales</b>	8	3	6
<b>Total holdings</b>	35	34	34


In the **first** and **second quarter** of the year we made no changes to the portfolio.

In the **third quarter** we made two changes to the portfolio. We sold our positions in Reckitt Benckiser and L-3 Communications.



We decided to exit **Reckitt Benckiser** on valuation and dividend yield grounds. The company, in our view, remains very well run, but we began to question whether the current valuation could justify us continuing to hold the stock. Reckitt Benckiser has performed well over the last five years. However, as the chart below shows, the majority of this total return has come from a re-rating of the multiple the stock trades on – it rose from around 11x forward earnings at the start of 2011 to 25x when we sold. As the dividend paid by the company has only grown by about 8% over our entire holding period (which is somewhat disappointing) the dividend yield compressed from about 4% to 2%. The market rewarded the company for focussing on household and personal care, cost cutting, and selling off the pharma division. We just wonder whether the market has now baked-in too high estimates for what the company is likely to achieve. If we were to see the stock underperform the market in the future and move towards a more reasonable valuation, then it is certainly something we would consider owning again.

**Figure 6: Reckitt Benckiser PE ratio and dividend yield**




From 3/30/12 to 12/31/15

Source: Bloomberg

We'd held **L-3 Communications** from the launch of the Fund on 31<sup>st</sup> March 2012. Over that time L-3 has experienced a significant valuation re-rating, broadly in line with other defence companies, all of which were deeply out of favour post the financial crisis as investors worried about government spending cuts. L-3 never had a very large dividend yield, averaging around 2.5-3% over the last five years. The dividend has grown significantly over time, however, averaging around 9% growth per annum over the last five years. This strong dividend growth has helped to support and 'drag up' the share price over time.

From a valuation point of view, the company appeared to be trading at stretched multiples – certainly in respect to where the company had traded historically – and this was a concern. What really drove us to sell the company, however, was the deterioration in the underlying quality of the business.

**Figure 7: L-3 Communications CFROI, asset growth and discount rate**



Source: Bloomberg

CFROI is Cash Flow Return on Investment

As the chart above shows the cash flow return on investment has declined quite significantly over 2014, and expectations were for this decline to continue into the future. Sales growth had been negative for a number of years and we had just started to see a decline in operating margins coming through. With little or no asset growth expected, it appears unlikely the company can reverse the decline in economic profits it was generating – and that the market is anticipating.



To replace these two sales we bought new positions in **WPP** and **Eaton**.



For the new buys we identified the three things we look for in any new investment: a history of persistence of return on capital, reasonable valuation, and a sustainable and growing dividend record. In the case of **WPP** we perceive a greater proportion of our expected total return should come from earnings and dividend growth, and only a moderate return from a multiple re-rating (as the company is trading only slightly below its medium-term multiple). **Eaton**, an industrial power management company based in the US, on the other hand has a higher dividend yield (just over 4%) but slower dividend growth, and we expect a greater re-rating in terms of its multiple as the stock was more out of favour and has been de-rated versus the broader market since the end of 2013.

In the **fourth quarter** we made a number of changes to the portfolio, selling four positions and replacing them with another four positions – bringing the total number of companies held in the Fund to 34 at the year end.

The four companies we sold were CNOOC, ENI, Meggitt, and China Mobile.



CNOOC and ENI were two energy companies held in the Fund (from a total of four), but with quite different exposures to the oil price. **CNOOC** is essentially a large cap. exploration and production company and is thus highly levered to the oil price. **ENI**, on the other hand, is the Italian national oil company which is an integrated oil major with interests throughout the oil and gas supply chain, and thus less exposed, but by no means immune, to the changing oil price.

The reasons for sale were different, but the over-supplied nature of the oil markets in general and the uncertainty surrounding the timing and mechanism of how this over-supply would be used up – whether from increasing demand trends or a reduction in supply from within or outside OPEC – gave us cause for concern. We do not profess to be able to ‘call’ the oil price, but we increasingly felt there were better opportunities available in other sectors that could offer better risk/reward characteristics. By maintaining a c.6% exposure to the sector through two of the higher quality, more diversified companies, we feel the Fund can still benefit from any re-rating in the sector that may occur over the coming months.

When we purchased **CNOOC** for the Fund in late 2013, we perceived that the company was well placed to grow production and also to improve margins on that new revenue – as the company increased efficiencies and lowered operating costs. At the time the oil price was trading around \$100 per barrel, and had been in a trading range of around \$95 (+/- \$10) for the previous three years. We did not buy the company based on a particularly bullish oil price thesis, but were happy that any downside was somewhat mitigated by the cheap multiples the company was trading on (9x forward PE) and that any oil price upside would likely be an additional benefit. In hindsight, our thesis that we had some ‘protection’

from a lower oil price was misplaced – as the scale of the oil price decline was much greater than anything we had envisaged. The company did post good operating results through 2014 and 2015, growing production in the double-digits and also maintaining its dividend. However, the dividend payout ratio increased from around 35% to over 60% for the interim dividend payment in September 2015. Based on the most recent dividend and the current low oil prices that payout ratio will likely rise. We therefore felt there was a real risk to a significant dividend cut in the short term, and any ‘lower for longer’ oil price scenario could adversely affect the potential for a recovery in the stock price over the medium term.

**ENI** has actually held up very well considering the macro environment for energy companies, as its integrated model helped cushion earnings from the steep oil price decline combined with a simplification of its holdings that had been long anticipated by the market. In Euro terms the company actually posted a positive return for the calendar year 2015, albeit only +0.5%.

Through the second half of 2015 there has been a growing disconnect between the share price of ENI and the prevailing oil price. Figure 12 shows how this has evolved over the last six months.

This probably shows that the stock is discounting a higher oil price in the future – which is indeed reflected in oil futures curves.

**Figure 8: ENI vs West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price (USD)**



Values as of 12/31/15

Eni: -15.2%

WTI: -37.7%

Source: Bloomberg

If these future oil prices are not as high as the market expects, then there is a risk that the stock price closes this 'gap' that has opened up, which could be a significant drag on future returns.

The final reason we sold ENI was that the company cut its interim dividend from €0.56 in 2014 to €0.40 in 2015, a reduction of almost 30%. This was taken well by the market as it helped the company to protect its balance sheet by conserving cash. Although this may well be a sensible decision by management in such uncertain times, we prefer to concentrate on companies that can grow their dividends. Even with this 30% dividend cut and a stock price that has held up relatively well, the company trades on a projected dividend yield for 2016 of a lofty 6%, which could be seen as an indication by the market that even this level is unlikely to continue in the near term.

By selling these two companies in the Fund, we reduced our energy sector allocation from around 11% to approximately 6% (we continue to hold Royal Dutch Shell and Total).

We had held **Meggitt** since the Fund's launch in 2012. The company's dividend has grown from 9.55p in 2011 to 14.10p in 2015 – averaging a healthy dividend growth of 10% per annum. The company surprised the market at the end of October 2015 by releasing a profit warning – despite having issued reasonably positive guidance for the full year in their August earnings call a couple of months previously. The stock fell over 20% on the day of the profit warning, a dramatic response.

In the August update the company had reiterated the guidance they had given at the start of the year of mid-single digit organic revenue growth for the full year. Alongside this the company announced an increase in their interim dividend of 8%. However, in its late October trading update the company reported that trading during the third quarter was below expectations due to a marked deterioration in September, and reported that these factors were expected to persist through the fourth quarter. We concluded that this trend was likely to persist beyond the fourth quarter too. We decided there was therefore a threat to both the dividend growth and the share price over the medium term, and we thus decided to sell the company. We will continue to monitor the company closely in the future and keep an eye on how their revenue stream evolves.

**China Mobile** had been a long-term and successful holding in the portfolio, having owned it since March 2012. The performance has been quite volatile, a reflection of both the overall Chinese market and some stock-specific issues. The company remains on what appear to be reasonable multiples, especially in relation to developed markets, of around 12x 2016 expected earnings. The underlying business has been in decline over the last few years, however, with the cash flow return on investment (CFROI, our preferred measure) declining from over 10% to just 6% in 2014, which is only marginally above its real cost of capital. This type of return on capital profile, alongside the company's good stock price performance and decreasing dividend payments, prompted us to sell the position.

The five companies we bought for the Fund in the fourth quarter were CME Group, Japan Tobacco, United Technologies and CA Technologies.

The below table highlights some simple metrics that aim to show the characteristics we considered when making these purchases, namely quality (average 10 year CFROI), valuation (P/E this year and next), and dividend (both current yield and historic growth over three and five years). For comparison, we have added the same data points for the wider MSCI World Index to place these companies in context.

**Figure 9: Key metrics of new purchases**

Company name	Sector	Av. CFROI	P/E		Dividend yield	Annualised div. growth	
		10 years	2016	2017	Trailing 12m (ex special dividends)	3 years	5 years
<b>CME Group</b>	IT	35%	20.6	19.3	2.3%	9.9%	39.7%
<b>Japan Tobacco</b>	Consumer Staples	17%	17.1	15.6	2.7%	25.3%	32.4%
<b>United Technologies</b>	Industrials	16%	14.5	13.3	2.7%	8.0%	8.5%
<b>CA Technologies</b>	IT	25%	11.7	11.2	3.6%	0.0%	44.3%
<b>MSCI World</b>	-	10%	16.0	14.2	2.6%	4.1%	6.9%

**Source Bloomberg (as of 12/31/15)**

**CME group** owns and operates a derivatives marketplace across multiple asset classes and offers both trade execution and clearing and settlement services. The company is not stand-out cheap, but is trading below its longer-term multiple. Considering the extremely high return-on-capital the company has achieved (and that we think it can continue to achieve), we are comfortable with the valuation. The current dividend yield of 2.3% at first glance appears modest, but the company has paid a large special dividend in each of the last five years. The regular cash dividends paid in 2015 totalled \$2.00 per share, but this was supplemented by a special cash dividend of \$2.60. Combining these regular and special dividends, the company had a dividend yield (12 month trailing) of 5.1% at the year end.

**Japan Tobacco** represents the first Japanese-listed company we have owned in the Fund, and therefore reduces our underweight in that region versus the benchmark. Tobacco companies have a bad name generally, and specifically as regards investment potential due to long-term regulatory issues. Our experience has been that these businesses have shown the ability to maintain (and actually grow) margins in the face of such issues as they successfully pass on price increases to customers. Return-on-capital has been high and stable at Japan Tobacco, which has translated into growing economic profit through increased sales, offsetting any declines seen in asset growth. Dividend growth has been positive over the past five years and appears to be picking up – the company increased its final dividend by 28% to 64JPY in 2015 (from 50JPY in 2014).

**United Technologies and CA Technologies** are two companies currently out of favour. United Technologies is a diversified industrial business and CA is a technology software company which focusses mainly on mainframe computing. United is also much larger, with a market cap. of \$85bn versus CA at \$12bn. However, they both have globally diversified revenues whilst still maintaining a decent exposure to the US (each at approximately 60% of sales) and have both been shown to be run successfully through good returns-on-capital over time. Neither is richly valued, but both provide a history of good dividend streams, if modest dividend growth. I would be surprised if either company became a '5-bagger' for the

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
Fund, but finding companies such as these with these characteristics is increasingly difficult and we are confident that both should provide good returns over the next three to five years, or however long we hold them. We have had good success focussing on the more unloved end of the market, and we see these as two companies that can exemplify this.

To summarize, the overall theme (as ever) has been to sell over-valued companies, or those where we feel there is a real risk to the dividend, and to replace them with higher quality businesses and specifically those where we feel there is a good opportunity for divided growth in the future. In today’s market environment we think this is a particularly relevant and important metric for investors to consider.

**Portfolio today and outlook**

The charts below show the sector, market cap. and geographic breakdown of the portfolio since the Fund’s launch at the end of Q1 2012. The effect of our 2015 changes are subtle but significant. On a sector basis we have increased our exposure to the IT sector by 2.6%, while we have reduced our exposure to the energy sector by 3.4%. Having been reducing our exposure to the consumer staples sector over the previous three years we have added one position back in this sector. We have still never owned a company in the utility or materials sectors.

**Figure 10: Portfolio sector breakdown (12/31/15)**




We do not run the Fund with reference to its benchmark, but it is illuminating to see how the sector weightings of the Fund compare to the MSCI World. The financial sector makes up the largest weighting in the portfolio today at just over 20%. We do not own any banks within this allocation – it is made up of insurance brokers, asset managers, exchanges, and brokers. The next highest weighting in the portfolio is consumer staples, which we have increased slightly with the addition of Japan Tobacco to the portfolio in Q4. Consumer staples is now the largest overweight versus the benchmark at 7.3%, just ahead our overweight in industrials of 6.4%.

The portfolio remains underweight versus both IT and consumer discretionary stocks. However, as we have written about in the past, it is interesting to see the increased number of more mature information technology companies that have begun to pay healthy dividends. This has meant more opportunities for

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us to buy such companies for the Fund, and as many of them have good balance sheets, and often significant cash on those balance sheets, we feel they have a good ability to maintain these newly initiated dividend policies and indeed to continue to grow their dividend payments quite significantly in the future.


**Figure 11: Portfolio weights vs benchmark (12/31/15)**



The Fund continues to hold no materials or utilities companies.


The changes made over the year did not alter the market cap. distribution of the portfolio in any significant way.

**Figure 12: Portfolio market cap. breakdown (31.12.15)**



In 2015 we increased our exposure to the US from 44.1% to 49.4%, while reducing our exposure to Europe by 3.1%. Our exposure to Asia-Pacific reduced by 1.6%, but this now includes the first Japanese stock purchased for the portfolio.

**Figure 13: Portfolio geographic breakdown (12/31/15)**



As we look forward in 2016, many of the uncertainties that existed in 2015 are still with us: the trajectory of US interest rates, the divergence of central bank policies, emerging market currency risks, weaker growth in China, and Europe grappling with various social and economic problems, to mention the most widely discussed topics.


We always try to avoid predicting the future but prefer to look at what we can know today with certainty.

A quick glance at valuations across the globe and within different sectors of the market highlight that there remains a wide divergence in investor expectations. We hope we can exploit these divergences by continuing to focus on those companies with the characteristics we seek and by looking to the long term, rather than reacting to short-term price movements or just following market momentum.

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**Figure 14: PE ratios – 2015 & 2014**



Source: Bloomberg (as of 12/31/15)

May we both wish you a happy New Year, and we look forward to updating you on the progress of the Fund over the course of 2016.

**Matthew Page, CFA**  
**Dr Ian Mortimer, CFA**  
 Portfolio managers, Guinness Atkinson Dividend Builder Fund

January 2016



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Opinions expressed are subject to change at any time, are not guaranteed and should not be considered investment advice.

*This information is authorized for use when preceded or accompanied by a prospectus for the Guinness Atkinson Global Innovators Fund. The prospectus contains more complete information, including investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses related to an ongoing investment in The Fund. Please read the prospectus carefully before investing.*

**Mutual fund investing involves risk and loss of principal is possible. The Fund's strategy of investing in dividend-paying stocks involves the risk that such stocks may fall out of favor with investors and underperform the market. In addition, there is the possibility that such companies could reduce or eliminate the payment of dividends in the future or the anticipated acceleration of dividends could not occur. The Fund invests in foreign securities which will involve greater volatility and political, economic and currency risks and differences in accounting methods. This risk is greater in emerging markets. Medium- and small-capitalization companies tend to have limited liquidity and greater price volatility than large-capitalization companies.**

[Click Here](#) for a list of Fund Holdings

Fund holdings and sector allocations are subject to change and should not be considered a recommendation to buy or sell any security.

The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed markets.

The MSCI World Value Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall value style characteristics across 23 Developed Markets countries.

The MSCI World Growth Index captures large and mid cap securities exhibiting overall growth style characteristics across 23 Developed Markets countries.

The MSCI US Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid cap segments of the US market.

The MSCI Europe Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid cap segments of the Europe market.

The MSCI Asia Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid cap segments of the Asia market.

The MSCI EM Index is designed to measure the performance of the large and mid cap segments of the EM market.

The S&P GSCI Commodity Index is one of the most widely recognized benchmarks that is broad-based and production weighted to represent the global commodity market beta

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The S&P MLP Index includes both master limited partnerships (MLPs) and publicly traded limited liability companies (LLCs), which have a similar legal structure to MLPs and share the same tax benefits.

One cannot invest directly in an index.

Grexit is a term to refer to Greece's potential withdraw from the Eurozone.

5-Bagger refers to an investment that appreciates to 5 times its initial purchase price

Payout Ratio is the percentage of net income that a company pays out as dividends to common shareholders.

Discount Rate is the minimum interest rate set by the Federal Reserve for lending to other banks.

Return on capital measures how effectively a company uses the money (borrowed or owned) invested in its operations.

Price to earnings (P/E) ratio is a common tool for comparing the prices of different common stocks and is calculated by dividing the current market price of a stock by the earnings per share.

Dividend yield is calculated by annualizing the last quarterly dividend paid and dividing it by the current share price.

**Growth stocks typically are more volatile than value stocks; however, value stocks have a lower expected growth rate in earnings and sales.**

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